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Hansen: Hansen: Public Access Doctrine in Copyright Law

THE PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW*
Building Officials & Code Administratorsv. Code Technology, Inc. (BOCA)'
Building Officials arid Code Administrators International (BOCA), a
private, nonprofit organization, developed, copyrighted, and published a
building code known as the "BOCA Basic Building Code/1978" (BOCA
code). On the issuance of a license from BOCA, Massachusetts adopted a
slightly modified version 2 of the BOCA code and distributed it officially as
the "Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Building Code." BOCA published a book that included the Massachusetts building code and a notice that
substantial portions of the book were copied with permission from BOCA
copyrighted material. Code Technology, Inc. (CT) published and distributed
its own edition of the state code, but did not obtain BOCA's permission to
copy the state code or publish BOCA's claim of copyright protection.
In an action under the Federal Copyright Act of 19763 (1976 Act) for
an injunction against infringement of BOCA's copyright, the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered a preliminary injunction against CT.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that BOCA's low probability of success on the merits
did not justify preliminary relief.5 The court indicated that the doctrine of
public access, 6 as previously applied to statutes and judicial opinions, also
* This Casenote, in revised form, was submitted to the National Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition as the entry of the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law.
1. 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
2. Slight alterations do not impair the original copyright or create a new or
original work by the copier. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162
F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947); Schnapper,. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426,428 (D.D.C.
1979) (by implication); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (by implication).
3. 17 U.S.C. §5 101-810 (Supp. III 1979). U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8 gives
Congress the power to secure "for limited Times to Authors ... exclusive Right
to their... Writings" in order to provide an economic climate conducive to the
creation and promotion of the arts for the public benefit. See Mazur v. Stein, 347

U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
4. 628 F.2d at 732.
5. Id. at 736.
6. The doctrine of public access provides that the access of the citizenry to
statutes and judicial opinions should not be limited by the granting of a monopoly,
in the form of a copyright, to any one individual. It also provides that the product
of a private party's own intellectual labor is copyrightable if it is severable from
the statute orjudicial opinion. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 5.06[C] (1981).
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applied to state-promulgated administrative codes modeled on privately
7
developed and copyrighted material.
The issue presented in BOCA was one of first impression. The court of
appeals relied heavily on the historical fundamentals of the public access doctrine and on the public's due process right of access to the law. At a time
when government publication reaches into every aspect of the written word,
the court's expansion of the public access doctrine indicates ajudicial move
away from traditional protection of copyright interests and toward increased
recognition of the interests of the public sector. Copyright protection could
become dependent on whether the copyrighted material becomes part of a
trial transcript, a federal informational pamphlet, or any other part of the
public record. 9
The doctrine of public access arose in seventeenth century England in
cases that affirmed the King's copyright to all reports and acts of
Parliament. 10 These cases sustained the proprietary interest of the King by
reasoning that every sovereign has an interest in its own products, which
interest arises from the nature of the products belonging to each and every
citizen. Employing a similar rationale, 1 American courts in a series of nineteenth century cases 12 adopted the public access doctrine and held that only3
the product of a private party's own intellectual labor could be copyrighted.1
Widespread acceptance of these cases and their interpretation of the public
access doctrine is generally inferred; only two cases have addressed the
copyrightability of statutes or opinions since the turn of the century.14 The

7. 628 F.2d at 734-35. BOCA's additional arguments based on federal
preemption under 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979) and state and federal disclaimer
under id. § 105 were summarily handled by the court. 628 F.2d at 735-36.
8. 628 F.2d at 732-35.
9. See, e.g., H. ROSENFIELD, TheAmerican Constitution,FreeInquiry, and the Law
in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 288-303 (1980).
10. For a survey of old English cases, see Banks & Bros. v. West Publishing
Co., 27 F. 50, 58 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886).
11. In an historical discourse on American copyright law, the Supreme Court
explained that the copyright holder had complete control over the property for the
statutory period. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). But cf. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1907) (rights under
patents).
12. See, e.g., Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 223 (1834); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898); Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319 (N.D.N.Y. 1888); Banks & Bros. v. West Publishing Co.,
27 F. 50 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); In re Gould, 53 Conn. 415, 2 A. 886 (1885); Nash
v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 19, 6 N.E. 559 (1886).
13. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888); Howell v. Miller, 91
F. 129, 138 (6th Cir. 1898).
14. See West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909); State ex rel. Helena Allied Printing Council v. Mitchell, 105
Mont. 326, 74 P.2d 417 (1937).
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public access doctrine has been expanded conservatively since then to include elementary legal words and phrases.15
The statutory incorporation of the public access doctrine is in section
7 of the Federal Copyright Act of 190916 (1909 Act) and section 105 of the
1976 Act. 17 The 1909 Act provided that "no copyright shall subsist in...
any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint in whole
or in part, thereof" 18 and qualified this with a saving clause intended to retain copyright protection for private works published by the government.1 9
This rule was the first statutory expression of the public policy that any work
produced and published 20 by the government must be accessible to the public
and belongs in the public domain.
Two cases decided by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York under the 1909 Act indicate that mere government
publication will not negate private copyright protection. 21 In Time, Inc. v.
BernardGeis Associates,22 the district court stated in dictum that the publication of privately copyrighted pictures in a government ieport does not affect the copyright holder's ownership. 23 In Marvin Worth Productionsv. Superior
Films Corp. ,24 the district court held that properly copyrighted material does
not fall into the public domain by inclusion in legal transcripts or opinions.2 5
The court also stated that the 1909 Act actually suggested a statutory policy
of upholding copyright protection despite inclusion in legal transcripts. 26 In
both cases, the district court had the opportunity, similar to the one in BOCA,
to expand the public access doctrine, but did not feel that the argument of
public access or domain was sufficient to alter the traditional judicial position of upholding copyright protection. Even the harshest critics of copyright
law would not refuse copyright protection toJamesJoyce merely because he
wrote a book that was the subject of litigation and, therefore, placed in the
15. See M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1140 (6th
Cir. 1973) ("guarantee," "storage fee," and "chattel mortgage" are in public
domain).
16. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909) (current version
at 17 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. III 1979)).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. III 1979). See also id. §§ 107, 403.
18. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909).
19. See id.
20. The 1976 Act broadened the copyright exclusion to both published and
unpublished works of the federal government. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. III 1979)
("Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United
States Government ....
).
21. For a discussion of these cases, see P. WITTENBERG, THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY PROPERTY 78-79 (1978).
22. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. Id. at 134 (dictum).
24. 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. Id. at 1271.
26. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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public record. 27 Yet, this is a reasonable extension of the BOCA court's
reasoning for extending the public access doctrine to privately promulgated
administrative regulations enacted into law and placed in the public record.
Privately created codes not prepared under a contract with the government but later adopted as law could be distinguished to allow some vestige
of copyright protection for the private creator of the code. At least one case
has held that material similar to BOCA's retained its copyright by maintaining an identity and use independent of its use by the government. 28 Also,
it would be reasonable to look to the intent of the parties to the licensing
agreement in BOCA. It is significant that Massachusetts accepted BOCA's
licensing terms, which included copyright protection for BOCA and referral to BOCA of any potential buyers of the code. The state acted in a manner consistent with the position that BOCA was the sole, rightful publisher
of the administrative code.
The BOCA court interpreted the language of the House Report on section 105 of the 1976 Act 29 as distinguishing adoption of privately copyrighted
material into law from mere publication by the government.3 0 The court
continued by pointing out that section 105 of the 1976 Act 3' and section 7

of the 1909 Act 32 by their terms only applied to works of the federal, not state,
government. 33 Thus, neither section could protect BOCA in this case.
The court in BOCA understandably was suspicious of the possible abuse
of discretion by BOCA in disseminating the administrative regulations. Instead of reviving the public access doctrine, which dissolves copyright protection, the court could have applied the statutory doctrine of fair use, 34 which
does not affect the copyright itself. Fair use is a privilege of others to use
copyrighted material without the consent of the owner. 35 One of the major
policies behind fair use is the public interest in the diffusion of information

27.

Id.

28. See Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426, 427-28 (D.D.C. 1979).
29. 628 F.2d at 735.
30. Id. (interpreting H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 5673 ("[Plublication or other use by the

Government of a private work would not affect its copyright in any way.")). The
report, however, did specify "publication or other use" by the government, which
may include adoption into law as not affecting copyright protection. See A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 44-45 (5th ed. 1979). See also Editorial Note, Piracyin
High Places-Government Publicationsand Copyright Law, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 423,
424 (1956) (discusses protection of copyright holder as against government).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. III 1979).
32. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909) (current version
at 17 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. III 1979)).
33. 628 F.2d at 735.
34. See generally Note, Right of Government Officials to Copyright Their Speeches and
Publications, 33 S. CAL. L. REV. 447 (1960).
35. Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/8
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affecting "areas of universal concern,' '36 including the fine and practical
arts, science, and history. The courts could have prevented possible abuse
3 7
of the copyright without eliminating BOCA's copyright protection.
Apart from the common law basis of public access is its constitutional
basis in the first amendment protections of freedom of the press and freedom
of speech.3 8 One writer contends that freedom of the press "protects the right
of reasonable access to copyrighted materials notwithstanding the copyright
law."39 Under this view, copyrights limit uncensored inquiry and assemblage
of information. The balance between the statutory right of the individual
copyright holder and the fundamental right of public access weighs in favor
of public access. Proponents of this interpretation of the first amendment
have become more adamant as the modem federal copyright statutes lengthen
the periods of copyright protection 40 and expand the subject matter
protected. 4' The other first amendment basis of the public access doctrine
springs from freedom of speech. TrianglePublications,Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc. 42 exemplifies this connection. In 1977, a Miami newspaper
began publishing a television program book in competition with TV Guide,
a nationally published program guide. As part of its promotional advertising, the newspaper ran television commercials that displayed and compared
the two guides. In an action for a preliminary injunction, the TV Guide
publisher argued that the display of its program guide on the commercial
without its permission infringed its exclusive right to display under section
106 of the 1976 Act. 43 The court did not invoke the fair use doctrine because

36. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977). For a complete
discussion of the underlying policies of the fair use doctrine, see S. FRIED, FairUse
and the New Act in THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW 205-27
(1977).

37. The limitation of the fair use doctrine is in defining its boundaries. See
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEWS 5678-79 (general background of fair use problem).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a discussion of ninth amendment implications, see also H. ROSENFIELD, supranote 9, at 297.
39. H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, at 296.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976) (life of author plus 50 years); Act ofJuly 8,
1870, ch. 230, §87, 16 Stat. 212 (1870) (28 years with 14 year renewal right); Act
of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 9 2, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (same); Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (14 years with 14 year renewal right).
41. See 17 U.S.C. §301 (1976) (any original works of specific authorship); Act
ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, 5 86, 16 Stat. 212 (1870) (dramatic works, photographs,
engravings, paintings, drawings, and various other works of art, in addition to items
under 1831 Act); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (musical compositions added to items under 1790 Act); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat.
124 (1790) (maps, charts, and books).
42. 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. 445 F. Supp. at 877 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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the defendant did not use TV Guide for the "purpose reasonably contemplated
by plaintiff when plaintiff created TV Guide for public consumption." 4' The
court concluded that the free speech interests of the first amendment would
be best served by denying the request for equitable relief: "Both ... [constitutional and copyright law] are oriented toward the preservation of an atmosphere conducive to the interchange of ideas." 4' The inference remains
that neither the first amendment nor copyright law are absolutes; rather,
they should be harmonized.
Together, the fair use doctrine and the first amendment obviate the need
for a public access doctrine in copyright law. Fair use and the freedoms of
press and speech limit a copyright holder's exclusive rights to publish, display,
and withhold publication, instead of striking down the copyright entirely.
This result comports with contemporary property attitudes. Very few critics
of the copyright law advocate its repeal, yet the BOCA court's acceptance
of CT's defense of public access in the sphere of public sector publications
effects that result. Private organizations and interest groups perform a
valuable public function by organizing, updating, and drafting regulations
and codes that the state could not do as well, given the limits of political considerations and economic conditions. If it is the growing sentiment of the
judiciary that the public be given ready access to privately promulgated
works, legislation providing for compulsory licensing or compulsory assignment would be a better way of providing such access while simultaneously
forewarning the author of the limitations of his copyright protection.
CHRISTINE L. HANSEN

44. 445 F. Supp. at 881. Cf. Keep Thomson Governor Committee v. Citizens
for Gallen Committee, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 788 (D.N.H. Oct. 2, 1978) (upheld
defendants' noncommercial use of plaintiff's campaign song as fair use as well as
on first amendment basis).
45. 445 F. Supp. at 882.
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